Introduction
Kurds, the largest stateless ethnic group in the
World, estimated around 35 million, are living half of them in Tukey and most
of the rest in Iran, Iraq, Syria and European countries as their diaspora. Either we evaluate Kurds’ land in the
aftermath of the demise of Ottoman Empire in 1914 or in 2017 in the curtail
drop of Cold War’s it has always been a site of great-power competition. A
fatal embracement of West and Russia civilizations along with a Christians and
Muslims co-existence challenge ending up repeatedly in defining successive
history times of World Order. From 1514
with the battle of Caldiran and Sunni Ottoman’s legitimacy prevail, as
defenders of the faith of Islam, towards Ismail’s Safavid Shiite dynasty to 1847
with the destruction of the Emirate of Bohtan, the last autonomous Kurdish
principality, the Sunni Kurdish tribesmen it was accepted to be the key to
security in the marchlands of Eastern Anatolia. (1)
In the 1920, Talcott Williams, Dean of Columbia
University School of Journalism, was wondering in his article “The American
Idea in the Near East”: “Shall the United States accept a mandatory for the
entire Turkish Empire or a trusteeship for Constantinople, and for Central and
Eastern Asia Minor, and the elevated plateau of “Armenia” in which Kurds, still
primitive in their rude culture, are in majority one-half of this area?” (2) He
concludes: “For the US to become unselfish trustee of humanity and civilization
in raising the people and territory of the entire Ottoman Empire to security,
self-government, self-rule, mutual respect and peace were the happiest harvest
that could grow from the red furrows of war watered by the blood and the lives
of 10,000,000 men shed in the past five years. This once done the World would
have before it lasting peace”. (3)
The post-Ottoman Empire, dominant with Turkish, Iraqi,
Syrian and Iranian national formations have conceived the Kurds as severe
threat to their national unity and sovereignty and established formal and
secret alliances to deal with their respective Kurdish issues. Paradoxically, it
is more appropriate nowadays to say that – rather than the Kurds- it is these
Turkish, Arab, and Iranian nation-state formations that are the problems in
need of solution. (4). In the last two decades the status quo that marginalized
the Kurds in the Middle East since the end of WWI has been gradually falling
apart. (5) In Iraq either referring to them as the Kurdistan region of Iraq or
“Northern Iraq” for those unwilling to recognize the constitutional reality,
the Kurds now exist as a discrete unit, with the capability to engage in
partnership with neighbors inside and outside Iraq and with the ability to
self-determine, to a degree not previously seen their future. (6)
But who are really the Kurds, how do they change and
in what direction? How do young Kurds identify themselves nowadays? Which
identity is predominant to the Kurds in Kurdistan: national, tribal, Islamic or
local? Do they feel Iraqis and if not, what are the reasons that don’t allow
them to become an independent state in the modern World? Do these reasons
remain still strong enough to forbid Kurdistan formation in 21th century as
well? What are other great and regional nations’ stances towards Kurds?
Indeed, the spectre of Sykes-Pycot re-emerged and the
idea of a domino effect through the different Kurdish regions made redrawing
the map of the Middle East a real possibility. An existing federal entity in
Iraq, nascent self-rule in Syria, renewal of activity by the PKK in Turkey and
by Kurdish political entities in Iran the last years were all signs that Kurds are
moving towards achieving additional rights from their respective governments. (7)
Is Kurdistan going to be soon the 194th
nation of UN in this World or is only a World Order dream never to be materialized?
What interests forbid 35 million of humans to have their own country based on
their will in this 21th promising for global human rights prevalence century? Is
it their fault or others’ power to blame for? How much Russia, Israel, Turkey and
US take responsibility for this Westphalia Treaty’s deadlock? Is oil the reason
above all that hinders an independent state for Kurds? Finally, how much Syria
uprising changed the regional balance and how much Kurds youth may institute a crucial
factor in the tittering of the global and regional balance towards or against
an independent Kurdistan in 21th century?
The above wonders are some of the quests that this
research will try to seek for ending with the most likely and most productive
way ahead for Kurds based on a peaceful, stable and decent Middle East in 21th
century.
The Kurds
Mehrdad Izady believes that the Kurds can be traced
back more than 50,000 years. From the 5th century BC to the 6th
century AD would be “the homogenizations and consolidation of modern Kurdish
national identity”. The Kurdish population occupies the territorial limits of
the Zagros Mountains, inhospitable area that has provided a geographical
“buffer” from the political interests of the Great Empires of the past leaving
the cultural space in the Kurdish language and culture to evolve. (8) The
nationalization of identity, territory and sovereignty in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries reconfigured and fueled up power struggles
among the former subject of Ottoman Empire inhabiting Anatolia and Mesopotamia.
As Hisyar Ozsoy, from The university of Michigan-Flint argues: “It was true
that the Kurds have fought many rebellions in the last two centuries, yet this
is due neither the nature of their “rebellious culture” nor the Kurds’ having
“no friends but the mountains. Rebellions have served as costly means of
cultural and political survival to find themselves within the labyrinths of
modern power in the Middle East”. (9)
In Iraq, Kurds suffered an internecine conflict
between their two major political parties, they control a landlocked territory,
and the neighbor they depend on most as an outlet to the World, Turkey fears
that the Iraqi’s Kurds experiment with self-rule would inspire its own Kurdish
minority. (10) No matter this, Kurds have made it clear since a long time that they
would stay committed to the new Iraq only if it is federal and democratic and
only if treated them as full partners, not as a minority to be kept pacified in
a semiautonomous region. (11)
Kurdish
Nationalism in Iraq
Ethnie, derived by Greek term ethnos, is defined by six
dimensions such as a homeland, common myths of ancestry, shared memories,
shared culture and measure of solidarity, at least among the elites. All the
previous may be considered in relation to the Kurds generally and in modern
Iraqi Kurdistan specifically. (12) According to Hobsbawn “Proto-nationalism”
describes an ethnic group’s development towards nationalism. (13) For Hugh
Seton-Watson “A nation exists when a significant number of people in a
community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they form one.”
(14) Anderson argues that “historically speaking the possibility for the
communities to imagine themselves as a nation only occurred when three
fundamental cultural conceptions” of fraternity, power and time collapsed
during the rise of capitalism in the late 18th century”. (15) Lastly,
Smith points out that “the decline of cosmic religions and monarchies happened
at the points when new conceptions of time and “print capitalism” made it
possible to imagine nations moving through linear time”. (16)
There is no universal theory of nationalism. It seems
that the theoretical explanation for the origins and development of nations
that best fits the Kurdish case is that proposed by Anthony Smith and the
historical ethno-symbolist school of thought.(17) Smith rightly judges
nation-formation to be a long-term process subject to a great variety of
influences: political, economic, social and emotional as conditions in respective
communities evolve and the elites are continually called upon to adjust their
means and goals accordingly to maintain their power and to keep the populace
thinking towards nationhood.(18) Several factors have played a role in consolidating
a sense of Kurdish national identity. These include national, territorial,
political and linguistic factors. Nationalism with its concepts such as common
culture, shared history, common myth, traditions, national essence, the flag,
the national anthem, language, spirit of people a folklore, all imaginary
creations that provide a group with a sense of “togetherness” have been present
for at least half a century in Kurdish people giving to them the most effective
answer to their identity. (19) Today, professional civic and ethnic allegiances
proliferate involving especially educated youth. Tribal affiliations and
religious loyalties no longer exercise a major influence in post-1990 Iraqi
Kurdistan.
On 10 August 1920 under Article 64 of the Treaty of
Sevres signed by the Constantinople (Ottoman) Government and by Allied powers
the Kurds would be granted independence within a year. Only Greece ratified the
Treaty and the provision for Kurdish autonomy never became reality. The Treaty
of Sevres redrew the political map of the Middle East largely in accordance
with the European interests. There were several concerns, such as fears over
the Soviet Union’s undue influence over newly formed states and Britain’s
concerns that there was no obvious choice of a Kurdish leader who could be
counted on to put national concerns above tribal interests that kept Kurdish
independence an elusive dream. (20) Nevertheless, from Ottoman Aghas to British
Sheiks in 1920s and through the two main currents of ideologies in the 1930s
and 40s communist with socialist ideas and pan-Arab nationalism that formed
secular urban strata by 1960s, Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) emerged and managed to reach the agreement of 11
March 1970 that provided in its 13 articles full recognition of Kurdish
nationality; autonomy with four years; a Kurdish Vice-president of the
Republic; five Kurdish Ministers in the Cabinet; Kurdish official language as
Arabic; formation of Kurdish political parties; integration of the peshmerga Kurdish fighters into border
guard and Army units; and a census and plebiscite to determine the status of
Kirkuk. (21) Ba’th regime chose the imposition of hegemonic power over the
state and 1970s till 1990s were marked by Kurds persecution, regimes atrocities
like Anfal campaign (1987-8) and use of chemical weapons in Halabja on 16 March
1988 along with Kurdish political split. After 1992 a great transformation in Kurds
political culture took place due to the decline of Ba’th hegemony and the
disappearance of its dominant authoritative apparatus. Kurdistanism meaning the promotion of Kurdistan in its civic and
traditional ethnic conceptions prevailed and the new generation views
themselves nowadays as Kurdistani
rather than Iraqi.
Nationalism for the Kurds can be regarded as a
state-seeking and nation-building movement, especially in the past 1990-era. (22)
Although Iraqi Kurdistan it is not
impossible to consider it as state or stately “entity” because it possesses the
attributes of: population, territory, governmental and administrative
institutions and significant informal and formal international relations it
still lacks a formal standing army; it is not recognized by the UN and it
doesn’t collect taxes from its citizens. (23) The political and administrative
experience of the last three decades have made it clear that Iraqi Kurdistan is
institutionalized politically as a de
facto Kurdish state. Findings indicate that the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) does not at present posses a broad-based democratic culture of fully
developed civil society. This leaves unanswered the questions about the
prospects for the emergence of a de juro
Kurdish political state in the future. (24) One cannot help but notice that the
Kurds have been entering a new era of nation-building since the 1990s. (25) In
the post-1990s era Kurdish children have been brought up without having to
learn Arabic history or language. For the Kurds in Kurdistan and elsewhere
independence become the ultimate dream. In recent years the KRG has appeared to
carry more political weight with the US and the international community than
ever before. (26)
Kurd
Youth
Universities have played a central role in political,
social and cultural movements around the world in the last two centuries.
Youthful social movements have impacted governments and have been known to
change the course of history. In the Kurdistan region there are 17 public and
private universities nowadays. Young educated generation of the post-1990s in
Iraqi Kurdistan come predominantly from the major cities, are mostly from the
middle class and tend to live in extended families. Their parents have high
levels of illiteracy compared to international standards. The Kurdish family is
still male-oriented, but it is hoped that with movement towards civic and
democratic values, the status of women in society at large will rise and women
will be more empowered to contribute in the family setting and overall to help
Iraqi’s Kurdistani productivity. According
to Mahir A. Asiz and his study in the three largest Kurds’ universities
students in the 18-25 age group it is Kurdistanism
rather than Iraqiness which is the focus
of national aspirations. (27) Kurds new generation’s conception of national
identity and its attitude towards Iraq are different from those of their
parents and grandparents. They were never taught or educated in the Arab Iraqi
school system; hence they lack the knowledge of Arabic or even extensive
knowledge in Iraqi’s geography and history. They did not witness the important
political development of Iraq that enabled Iraqi Kurdistan to be
self-government.
96,8% of Kurdish youth identify themselves as
“Kurdistani”(73,1%), “Kurds”(17,3%), “Kurdistanis but not Iraqis”(5,1%) while rest
“more Iraqi than Kurds” (2,2%) and “Iraqi not Kurd” (0,89%). Those that they
don’t consider themselves Kurds are expected to be Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian or Arabs.
(28) The national, territorial and linguistic factors are most crucial in
consolidating Kurdish national identity than political, economic and
educational that follow. (29) 88,89% feel very proud to be a Kurd or Kurdistani and 87,33% not very proud (7,78%),
not at all proud (3,56%), while regarding the strength of Pride as an Iraqi
feel not Iraqi (76,00%). (30) 84,2% does not belong to any tribe. It appears
that overall the tribe and tribal affiliation is not as salient in the minds of
the young educated strata as it might have been for past generations. (31) 81%
strongly disagreed that Islam is a vital factor for Kurdish unity while another
surprising finding is that the further away from the city you go, the less you
are likely to feel Islam is the key to unity (32) 62% make use of Internet,
19,3%TV, 12% Newspaper, 1,3 Radio and 5,3% all the above. (33)
Petro-Politcs
Vast reserves of crude oil and natural gas lie beneath
Kurds territory. It is not secret that 95% of Iraq’s national income comes from
oil. (34) Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921 up to 90s the
Kurds never controlled their economy. In the 1990s KRG started receiving 13% of
the oil revenues garnered from the Oil-for-Food Programme under UN Security
resolution 986. The stability of the Kurdistan region has allowed it to achieve
a higher level of development than other regions in Iraq. In 2005 the
Sunni-Shiite street war erupted and no matter the ‘surge” of US troops in 2007
the Kurds began exploiting their most prominent asset: the vast reserves of
crude oil and natural gas. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, and Gazprom have signed
exploration contracts with KRG giving a whopping vote of confidence in the
latter’s nascent economy. The region has attracted medium-sized companies from
around the world, including US ones, such as Hunt Oil, HKN, Marathon Oil,
Murphy Oil and Hess. (35) Kurds faced soon the reality that the only way to get
their product to market is to send it through an existing pipeline that runs
outside the Kurdish region’s boundaries from the city of Kirkuk to the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (36). Turkey urgently needs access to Iraqi’s
energy resources to fulfill its regional policies. (37) KDPs leader Barzani offered
Turkey powerful incentives to turn away from Baghdad: a possible regular flow
of 1 million barrels of oil a day through a set of direct pipelines, a stable
Sunni Kurdish buffer on Turkey’s southeastern border against Shiite-dominated
Iraq’s government and the KRG’s help in blocking Kurdish rebels from expanding
more into Kurdish areas of Syria.
As latest events showed Kirkuk seems the pearl to acquire
for all regional and international players. Historian Juan Cole in 2007 urged
caution ‘the Kurds are trying to annex oil-rich Kirkuk province to their
Kurdistan provincial confederacy. Turkmens and Arabs do not want to be annexed.
Turkey does not want to see it annexed.” (38) Though federal Bagdad government
has retaken the oil fields that the last three years were handled by KRG with
rumors the Kurdish faction of PUK party led by Talabani family proposed jointly
governing Kirkuk with Bagdad, still all export infrastructure from the city
goes through Kurdish-controlled territory. (39) Meanwhile Turkey though
supports the KDP, it doesn’t want it to become strong enough to assert
independence, thereby encouraging Kurdish groups across the Middle east – including
Turkey to follow suit. (40) If Barzani and the KRG back away from declaring
independence Turkey could resume its support. Iran as reported strongly backs
Iraq’s operations in Kirkuk. Given the possibility that Iran-backed militias
will be able to hold their ground in Kirkuk after the Kurdish withdrawal many
Kurds fear that Iran will be able to capitalize on the territorial shifts. (41)
US were caught between Arbil and Bagdad. They try to appease both sides,
drawing on the deep security and economic relationships it has with each. When
it comes to choosing, the US back Bagdad deepening the sense of betrayal the
Kurds feel towards the US. The fact is as the fight against the Islamic State
moved away from Kurdish-controlled area, the US has less need for the Kurdish peshmerga. (42)
Syria
Kurds
In July 2012, Kurdish political parties took control
of most Kurdish towns and regions in the north of Syria. The idea that
systematic abuses of human rights could not be sustained in the present climate
without international intervention in some form convinced the Kurdish people
and parties in Syria to take greater risks to achieve higher aims. 33SK Most Kurdish
sources put the number of them up to 3 million or around 15% of the total
pre-war Syrian population of 22 million. Until after the start of the Syrian
uprising in 2011 there were more than 300,000 Kurds in Syria who were completely
stateless and denied rights with Syrian citizenship as a result of a one-day
census that was conducted back in 1962 in the predominantly Kurdish province of
Hasaka. The census after the collapse of Syria’s union with Egypt in 1958 was
based on the ‘Arabization’ of Syria. That artificial demographic change, and
the denial of the Kurdish existence in Syria defined their relations with the
Ba’th Party Syria state. (43) These despair stateless Syrian Kurds either ajanib or maktumiin became subjects of severe exploitation that played
important role in the Syria uprising in a time when Kurdish parties movement
was amid a crisis but Kurdish national consciousness at its higher level.(44)
In 1927 Kurdish intellectuals, leaders of tribes,
skeikhs and rebel fighters from Turkey, Syria and Iraq established the Xoybun
League to unify their political efforts and turn their struggle towards so as
to liberate the Kurds from Turkish “claws”. (45) After a revolt in Ararat the French
and the British, under the pressure from Turkey, imposed heavy restrictions on
those involved in Xoybun. (46) In 1957 after the rise of the left in Syrian
national politics Kurds established their first political party Partiya Demokrat a Kurd li Syriye. Many
others followed all characterized as illegal, causing factionalism due to
diverse reasons such as internal party dynamics, personalities of the
leadership as well as external factors such as the intrigues of the Syrian
security services, involvement of Kurdish parties of other areas of Kurdistan
and diaspora, or changes in international relations. (47) The evidence suggests
that the fragmented state of the Kurdish political body is not a deliberate or
conscious strategy of the parties; nonetheless only a factionalized body could
have survived the political environment in Syria. (48) In Syria without
mountains and with divisions between Kurdish areas, there were few options
available. (49) Both the passive and the more confrontational approaches of the
different parties towards the regime contributed to incapacating the Kurdish
national movement and prevented effective social mobilization with political
objectives. No matter their limited freedom of operating they were the ones in
the absence of any other traditional forms of nationalist leadership or
organization that have stepped in to promote, maintain, reproduce and organize
Kurdish cultural identity through decades.
The change of Syrian Kurds towards their political
parties was due to four primary factors: the withdrawal of intellectuals from
the party ranks, the development and availability of information technologies,
the growth of generational differences within Kurdish society and the rise in
popular consciousness amongst the Syrian Kurds.(50) With attention focused on
Syria’s major cities and its campaign against the Sunni Arab rebel opposition
forces in these areas the regime did little to prevent the Kurdish regions. (51)
The Kurds found themselves caught between the regime and the Arab opposition
with little option but to entrench in the Kurdish regions developing both
political (Supreme Kurdish Committee, SKC) and defensive mechanisms with the
mediation of Iraqi Kurds and its KDP leader Barzani in an unprecedented way
since 1957. As Syria instability goes on, the Syria opposition remains in
general divided and Kurds concertation focuses on unity and on securing and
managing Kurdish regions by all parties and organizations within the Kurdish
bloc, unresolved fault lines are left within Kurdish political movement and
between Kurdish and Arab opposition groupings. (52)
The Others
Russia...
The Ottoman Empire has long served as a barrier to
Russia’s southern competition. The notion that imperial Russia could hold
appeal for Muslim tribesmen has always been difficult to comprehend for
Europeans. That Russia could command fear and demand respect was understandable
but what of positive value could Russia offer? There was limited projection
only in a unidimensional projection of military and diplomatic power excluding
Baku’s oil industry impact on migration patterns in Iran, wider influences of
socialist movements in the Caucasus and more challenging Russia’s relationship
with Kurds. (53) When the new force in Ottoman politics the Committee of Union
and Progress tried to impose centralization by subduing and displacing the
tribal elites in 1908 the Kurds had an alternative by applying in Northern Iran
for Russian subject status and a path to civilization through Russia. (54) Russia’s
interest dated back as early as 1787 and Catherine the Great who had
commissioned the publication of Kurdish grammar. Russia’s interest was
threefold. First, Kurd’s existence in southern Caucasus, second Britain, France
and Germany were all jockeying for advantage in the area and third because Kurds
represented the flip side to the Armenian Question and the latter’s possible
empowerment after Ottomans Empire “failed state” danger.
Whereas the Great powers of Europe were distant and
unreliable, Russia was nearby and could wield its power to liberate Kurds. “It
will be easiest for us to do this inside Iran. If we succeed in doing this,
then I will quickly raise a rebellion in Turkish Kurdistan. Then the Kurds will
ask the Russian emperor to take them under his patronage and secure their
independence” as Abdurrezak Kurdish leader argued (55). Russia’s proximity
guaranteed that it would continue to exert influence over the future of the
Kurds. Soviet Union took up sponsorship of Turkish and Iranian Kurdish
organizations in the 1920s. In the 1940s Kurds under Soviet tutelage formed the
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In the mid-1940s when the short lived Kurdish
republic of Mahabad in Northern Iran was destroyed Mula Mustafa Barzani with
2000 fighters fled to Soviet Azerbaijan where offered political asylum. In 1957
his refugees having undergone training in Tashkent formed a Commando Brigade
and secretly deployed in the Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq. (56). In mid
1960s, a series of armed clashes between Kurds and Iraqi troops began breaking
out in the Kurdish-populated territories of Northern Iraq. Not only the clashes
evolved into open guerilla warfare, but they also spilled into the neighboring
Turkey, Iran and Syria. Some historians maintain the Soviet Union was one of
the masterminds behind that clashes. (57) That popular movements of liberation throughout
non-Western world aligned to Soviet Union suggests that the Kurdish patriot and
Russophile Abdurrezzak perhaps should be seen not as a quixotic figure from the
terminal age of empire but instead perhaps as a prototype of a new kind of
actor in the global politics of the later 20th century. (58)
Israel
Recently,
a group of Israeli experts published the results of research based on genetic
analysis, which claimed that most of the Jews are distant ethnic relatives of
the Kurds. The scientists believe that Jews and Kurds descended from a common
ancestral population that inhabited the border regions of modern Iraq and
Turkey. (59) Some estimates have the total number of Kurdish Jews in Iraq by
the mid-20th century at 40,000-50,000. (60) Almost the whole of
Jewish community of Iraq (120,000) one of the oldest in the Diaspora was
evacuated in 1950 under the Operation Ali Baba via neutral Cyprus following the
so called Palestinian War or the Israeli War for Independence of 1948-49 as
Jews had become subjects of brutal persecution by the Arab government. As
Israel’s primary information source, Kurdish Jews always shaped Israel’s
policies on Kurds. Probably nowhere in the world is the Kurdish ethno-political
factor subject to such scrutiny and political planning as in Israel. (61)
The
national security strategy of the Jewish State has traditionally been based on
two essential tenets. “Determinism” assuming the support to Israel by a leading
superpower and “Peripheral Strategy” of security cooperation with the non-Arab
regional powers. The Kurds have always been featured in Zionist thinkers’ plans
on the Middle East. (62) Israel had
covertly established quite close contacts with the leaders of the Kurdish
movement. It kept military advisers at the head-quarters of the Iraqi Kurdish
leader Mula Mustafa Barzani from 1965 to 1975, training the insurgents and
supplying them with light arms, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The US also
took part in that campaign. (63) Israel’s support to the Kurds was perceived as
threatening the very sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Iraqi state.
For Iraq this support was no less an attempt to establish a “second Israel” in
the Northern Iraq. (64) In 1982 Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs Oded Yinon
in his article “A strategy for Israel in Nineteen Eighties” wrote: “Iraq rich
in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other hand is guaranteed as a
candidate for Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is more important than that of
Syria. In Iraq, a division into provinces along ethnic/religious lines in Syria
during Ottoman times is possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around
the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shite areas in the south
will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish North.” (65) The significance of the
Kurdish factor in Israel’s global geo-strategy in the near and middle East
never was diminished. (66)
Turkey
“It has coal on the Black Sea, oil fields on the
Persian Gulf, unused grain fields up to 200 million bushels, the great copper
area France is seizing, the world’s current supply of opium, liquorice and the finer
tobaccos, a natural silk area, land and rainfall suited to cotton in
Mesopotamia and to wool in Asia Minor and the Sothern plain. Added the shortest
railroad line to India and the best marine frontage of any land on the Black
Sea, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, with river navigation
all told 2000 miles” Talcott Williams, Dean of Columbia University School of
Journalism was writing back in 1920 before Turkey Republic foundation (67) When
established in 1923, Turkish Kurds made up some 18% of the population where
characterized as “Mountain Turks’. (68) “The Turk is the sole effendi (master)
and owner of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish blood have only
one right in this country. The right to be servants, the right to be slaves”
Mahmut Bozkurt, Turkish Minister of Interior in Agri in 1930. While Armenians
were genocided and Greeks were dealt with population exchanges the Kurdish
geography resulted into a “zone of “exception’ where the state produced and
exercised its sovereignty by means of martial laws, emergency state rules,
compulsory resettlement, destruction of villages, regimes of torture, exiles,
executions, extra-judicial killings, and even genocides as in the case of
Dersim. (69). Kurds soon resurfaced in the political scene in the 1960s mostly
part of Turkish left and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) became the
political agent to lead Kurdish struggles after the military coup in 1980 by
initiating a guerilla warfare to establish a unified, independent and socialist
Kurdistan. (70)
Following PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan imprisonment in
1999 and EU grant of Turkey of candidacy status Turkish governments passed some
constitutional and legal reforms between 2001 and 2004. Over the last two
decades PKK transformed by shifting from revolution to democracy, from
separation into integration, from targeting state power to organizing (in) the
(civil) society – all of which are happening in the context of a worldwide
ideological shift away from ideology/class and toward culture-/identity-based
political imaginaries. (71) The negotiations and reforms so far indicate that
Turkey may accommodate some Kurdish cultural demands in the form of individuals
rights, but it is extremely uncompromising when it comes to collective rights
and redistribution of political sovereignty which constitute the crux of the
conflict for many Kurds. (72) While ruling AKP achieved its goal to marginalize
the Kemalists and gradually destroy military tutelage over civilian politics
the Kurds expectations that EU process would also open a democratic space to accommodate
their cultural and political demands did not materialize. (73). Currently, the
Kurds are the only organized popular resistance movement in Turkey to challenge
or limit the AKP’s increasing authoritarianism. (74)
Before Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
government was reelected in July 2007 he made a calculated decision to shift
his foreign-policy away from his NATO allies in Europe where EU membership has
stalled and cast his glance eastwards with the intention of establishing
himself as the region’s preeminent leader and positioning Turkey as the
indispensable link between West and East. He had seen a new World Order taking
shape and felt obliged to ride this wave of popular revolution and revolutionary
change. (75) While Turkey and Syria have managed to avoid direct armed
conflict, the two sides engaged in was by other means, such as safe harbor to
refugees fleeing Syria as well as Free Syrian Army, the consequences of which
will shape the region’s structure, borders, and balance of power for years to
come. (76) Turkey cannot fulfill its desire to become the regional power unless
it makes peace with the Kurds at home. (77) A genuine peace is needed and not
“technical approaches” which can only be built by transforming the political
ontology of the Turkish nation-state. (78) Otherwise, it should be prepared for
other options that the Kurds may develop out of dislocating developments in the
Middle East. (79)
According to Hiltermann, MIT Centre for International
Studies: “The Turkish state is aware that it has lost the battle with Kurds.
And Kurds are also aware of this, that’s why they are constantly raising the
bar with their demands” (80) The question is how far Turkish leaders will go -
whether they will be prepared to abandon their Plan A, reinforcing a unified
Iraq, for plan B, linking up with entities estranged from Baghdad, such as the
Kurds and the largely Sunni provinces in northern Iraq, at the risk of breaking
up Iraq. (81) “The rhetoric in Ankara has changed. Officials no longer refer to
Iraq’s unity as a sine qua non; now
it is a “preference”.
US
On
the 4th July 2007 Bush Administration again warned sovereign Turkey
against a cross-border operation against PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The
sentiment of Kurds in the street was described as: “The United States’ apathy
is overwhelming. Common sense common justice has been rare with American leaders
regarding their relationship with Turkey…” Rauf Naqshbandi sent a letter to
President Bush, a letter meant for Turkey’s Prime minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan: ‘A free and independent Kurdistan is imminent for it is the will and
determination of the Kurdish nation. It will be beneficial to you and your
people; therefore, I ask you not to tolerate it but rather to welcome it
wholeheartedly. (82) PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan stated as well from his jail:
“If you focus on Turkish nationalism and extremism, the Kurds will react in a
same way and separation will be soon a fact. To lose Kurds means to lose Turks.
That is why the Republic should be democratized. The Kurds are too strong. They
have mountains, cities and villages. They will be able to defend themselves.
The connection between the Kurds and Iran dates back before the birth of Jesus
Christ.” (83)
In 2007, in an interview with BBC, PKK leader Murat
Karayalan revealed: “US and Britain came to Iraq to establish a democratic
system, but this scared the Iranians, so they negotiated with us and offered
many things to attack the coalition. But we told them the Iranians that the US
and Britain were going to solve the Kurdish problem and we will not be with
them. The same year, US Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report
on “Integrated Strategic Plan needed to Help restore Iraq’s Oil and Electricity
Sectors’ leaving no doubt as to intentions that was the US designed hydrocarbon
law of Iraq would benefit US loyal servants, the Kurdish parties that run the
local KRG along US allies Britain and Israel. According to assessment by
infowars: “The new law would transfer ownership of the majority of Iraq’s oil
from the Iraqi government and hand it to multinational oil companies linked mostly
with US though the British would have a slice of the action. Many Iraqis now realizing
what experts have been saying since 2003: that the invasion of Iraq was about
oil and Israel, and not about America’s security”. Israel Haaretz issued a
report one week later under the heading “US checking possibility of pumping oil
from Northern Iraq to Haifa, via Jordan”. (84)
In August 2007, America-Kurdish Friendship League
(AKFL) was formed. New Jersey rep. Pete Hoekstra opened with his declaration:
“There has been a long and solid friendship between the Kurdish and America
people based on the belief in fundamental principles such as democracy,
freedom, and acceptance of different religions. AKFL represents an important
step in building a stronger relationship between our two countries… The US and the West have a golden opportunity to
embrace 50 million Kurds who are secular Muslims. The AKFL will seek to promote
peace and democracy in the Middle East as well as religious tolerance and
friendship among Arabs, Jews, Kurds, Persians and Turks” (85)
Exactly as civilization has in the past agreed upon
religious liberty, representative institutions and the abolition of serfdom, so
soldiery is no longer the necessary of possible concomitant of a stable social
order. Every man and every woman, every statesman and voter the world over, is
aware that it is no possible to govern by force when Egyptian fellahs throw
themselves against machines guns. (86) “Kurds have a history of misread British
intentions, much as the misunderstand Israel’s motives. Which explains in some
measure why British official Sir Mark Sykes dubbed them “the simplest and most
gullible of mortals”. (87)
The End
It is clear that what underlies Kurdish national
identity is a “sense of place’ rather than a “sense of tribe and blood”.(88) Control
over a given territory is a key claim of nationalism.
The Kurd’s future, like the fate of other minorities
groups around the world, would come to be determined by their efforts to
reclaim their ethnic identity through various demands – initially for minority
recognition and rights, later for autonomous zones, and now for independence,
something that seemed wholly implausible before the invasion of Iraq and the Arab
uprisings. (89)
Kurdish youth when it comes to national identification
there is little doubt who they think they are. They are Kurds, Kurdistani, or Kurdistanyeti, first and foremost. It
was the events of the 1990s that coalesced to ripen a sense of Kurdistani
identity that currently defines the character of Kurdish society - and this, it
seems evident, is now irreversible. (90)
As one proclamation from 1898 put it: “Oh, Kurds! Our
century is the century of science. The time of performing heroic deeds in the
mountains has passed, all nations now study in schools, and thanks to education
they are seizing their right to freedom from usurpers”. (91) Like many Muslim
intellectuals around the world in that era they saw education as the key to
security and advancement. This education seems to have become at last a reality
in the 21th century.
As Kurdistan enters into and interacts with the
international community and bright Kurdish students and scholars go abroad to
study, there will be more intermingling, intermarriage and the embracing of
democratic ideas. It is believed that Kurdistan is on the path to democratic
and civic-minded methods and procedures that will enable it to be a “beacon of
light on the way to peace’. (92)
Modern nationalism for the Kurds since 1990s may be
regarded as a state-seeking and nation-building movement. It is clear, Iraqi
Kurdistan is institutionalized politically – not in a fully self-sufficient
independent manner as a UN-recognized State, but as a de facto Kurdish state.
It does not at possess a broad-based democratic culture or fully developed
civil society. This leaves for many unanswered the questions about the
prospects for the emergence of a de jure
Kurdish political state in the future. (93) Apart an unprecedented building
boom in Iraq Kurds are now articulating a once-unthinkable notion: that the day
will break free from the rest of Iraq is nigh. (96)
The Kurds in Syria having achieved such significant
political advances, albeit without the resources of the state and in uncertain
position, will not easily relinquish the degree of control that they have
obtained during the Syrian uprising (94) On the state
level, the more general pursuit of human rights, pluralism, and democracy
within Syria state remains a priority, but one which the majority of Kurds
believe cannot be achieved through existing opposition alliances or through
centralized political unit. (95)
International powers have regarded the pursuit of
Kurdish interests as an obstacle to preserving the status quo in the Middle
East. Certainly, the Kurds have historically been used as pawns in inter-state
politics and rivalries between Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. (97) Anti-Kurdish
propaganda campaigns linked Kurdish nationalism to Zionism and Western
imperialism, portraying Kurds as traitors and separatists. (98)
In 20th century changing economic relations combined
with European influence are transforming intercommunal relations and subtly but
palpably eroding the traditional order. (99) West challenged the norms and began
to undermine the status quo in three ways. Integration of Eastern Anatolia into
the global economy, the arrival of West businessmen and capital and growing
number of Christian missionaries and social organization through schools and
institutions. (100) Nowadays the fruits of that starting point seems to have
matured ready to be collected by anyone.
“Only en masse
can the Kurds constitute a serious force” Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, Russia
Foreign Minister. 1880 uprising of Kurds in Iran was characterized by Near
Eastern scholar Vladimir F.Minorskii premature since the Kurds "still
lacked unifying cultural fundaments” prone to “unruly and wild movements”. He
urged that his government undertake deep social and cultural reforms to
transform Kurds into a more stable and reliable social element. (101) The
meeting point from both sides seems to have reached along with other interested
remaining only to see who they will shake their hands first.
Russia’s appeal to the Kurdish chief was mentioned dual
– as a gateway for Kurds to European enlightenment and as a vehicle to the
restoration of the elite’s local supremacy. (102) If Abdurrezzak and the Kurds
brought Anatolia to a state of chaos, it would be a “victory for the Russian
government and a disaster of our state” Ottoman Interior ministry officials
(103). In a manifesto Abdurrezzak wrote called Kurds to support Russians who
would drive out from Kurdistan the “Rumi”, or “Romans”, a term Kurds used
derisively to refer to the Ottoman Turkish successors to the Eastern Roman
(Byzantine) Empire. (105) Little seem to have changed since then.
“United
Kurdistan” is a sufficiently Utopian conception, such an attempt might well
begin with an Armenian massacre and bring Russian intervention in its train”
British missionaries mentioned in 1914. (104) The former happened right
afterwards the latter remains to be seen.
For Turkey the risks of throwing its support behind Iraq’s
Kurds would be enormous. A disintegrating Iraq would strengthen Iran’s quest
for regional dominance and an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would further empower
Turkey’s own Kurdish minority. Turkey urgently needs access to Iraq’s energy
resources. Most likely, in the end, the Kurds will remain stuck in Iraq, but
more and more on their own terms. (106)
If the Arab Spring was a stone dropped in the waters
of Middle East politics, the waves it created, passing through Syria, now lap
upon the shores of Turkey’s domestic politics, creating uncertainty even more
than conflict. “What’s interesting is that Kurds know what they want, but
nobody knows what the government will do. Because the government itself doesn’t
know it either”. (107)
From 1918 to 1923 British colonial officers had no
clear policy or approach toward the Kurds or the Mesopotamian region. This was
due the inconsistency between the India Office and the Foreign Office. (108)
A single successful example furnished by Turkey of an
Asia people raised to self-government would give hope to the subject lands of
all the earth. (109) Where other nations would need armies to keep order, our (US)
flag would need only a police. (110)
Four new principles the American people have given in
the political organization of society – a successful federal system of rule,
the indispensable association of taxation and representation, a uniform civil
status for all citizens and a colonial government administrated with a view to
the development, autonomy and ultimate equality in self-rule of the dependency
without distinction of race. (111)
In the 16th century it became clear that
religion could not be imposed by authority, in the 17th and 18th
representative government became inevitable, in the 19th chattel
slavery was abolished in a decade and in the 20th it has ceased to
be possible to govern any land or any people from without. What about 21th
century and Kurds?
Business cannot go on as usual in 21th century World
Order. WWI failed to prevent WWII and WWIII should not take place in humanity’s
history. The will of 35 million stateless people should prevail putting human
rights above any artificial social structures and their foundations.
There is plenty of space in this World for an order
that will bring democracy and liberty the core values of the most developed
societies into geographical areas that still considered tribal wrongly though
interconnected and functioning fully already in all 21th dimensions.
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