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thedayaftergr ενημερώνει τους αναγνώστες του, στην Ελλάδα και κυρίως
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σύντομη επιστροφή στον Έλληνα Αξιωματικό και Έλληνα Υπαξιωματικό μας.
Abstract
Turkey for the first time in its
modern history since its foundation as the Republic of Turkey in 1923 is ruled
by an Islamic political party AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi/ Justice and Development Party) from 2002. Based on its all-time strategic landscape
it is privileged with unique advantages in the same time with vital challenges.
The “post-modern” era have found it with a dazzling and frightening as well
Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) towards allies and enemies. What remains to be
seen is if this seemingly “lone wolf” state attitude will lead it to glorious
days or its self-destruction. Indeed, global and regional states trace TFP both
jealously and gluttonously either to join it or to extinguish it.
Introduction
Although AKP has
strived in the new millennium to conceive and implement a TFP in a different
way the “state interest” and its voracious pursuit has been again its utmost
goal. Appearing to be chasing its tail Turkey seems to tilt between West and
East based on an unstable triangle that is shaped with West at its left down
angle, Russia at its upper one and East at its right down one all as
centripetal forces. US, Russia and Iran respectively are enforcing power to drag
TFP to their side with NATO, EU on its left, Israel on the bottom and Kurds on
its right as transnational, national and stateless entities that are regulating
TFP center of gravity.
President Tayyip Erdogan and leader of dominating political
party AKP since its ascendance in power in 2002 applies a TFP based on his
academic ex-advisor, ex-Minister of Foreign and ex-Prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu
and his beliefs and insistence on a resurgent “central power” role for Turkey
in the new World of globalization and ambiguity.
Whether TFP is a new approach of
“critical geopolitics” or a renewed one of “classical geopolitics” adjusted in
the power politics of post Cold-war era through bargaining remains to be seen.
In a similar way the TFP phenomenal distance from West towards Russia and
Middle East is arguable regarding its strategic depth and viability. This paper
will focus through critical geopolitics and a de-constructivist manner of
examining texts and discourses contained in essays and politician’s statements on
identifying the pragmatic extent of TFP tilt towards any other side of the West,
the carefully hidden or not thoughts of AKP political elites in exercising TFP and
an estimation for the final position of TFP’s center of gravity so as not
collapse.
TFP Doctrine
TFP “post-modern” doctrine has been founded on Ahmet Davutoglu
academic theory often dubbed as “neo-Ottomanism” misleading analysts. His book
“Strategic Depth” published in 2001 includes his vision and his rapid political
ascendance in AKP gave him the privilege as a theorist to implement his theory
in the practice of International Relations. As Prof. Ioannis Grigoriadis argues
Davutoglu’s in his view Turkey engulfs Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus, Central
Asia, Caspian, Mediterranean, Black and Gulf Sea political space and has to
claim and secure a global strategic role. He abandons the concept of Turkey as
a static bridge between West and Islam with Turkey as pure geopolitical spatial
tool on the hands of strong states and he seeks for a proactive policy
analogous with the historic and geographic depth of Turkey since its
post-Ottoman Empire establishment in 1923.(1) He
mentioned “a comprehensive civilizational dialogue is needed for a globally
legitimate order” and urged for a move from TFP traditional “threat assessment
approach” towards “an active engagement in regional political systems in the
Middle East, Asia, the Balkans and Transcaucasia”.(2)
Also, Davutoglu identifies
as two prerequisites the domestics politics and Turkey’s relations with its
neighbors. For the former he concentrates on the Kurdish issue and the
centripetal relation between the Islamist and secular characteristics of Turkey
society while for the latter he desires a “zero-problem” TFP towards Syria,
Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Greece – Cyprus and Israel specifically. For 2023 and the
100th anniversary of the foundation of Turkey Republic Davutoglu
envisions through his ambitioned TFP as Turkey a full member of the EU, in full
peace with its neighbors, an effective role in setting orders in regions where
TFP foresees national interests and finally an active role in all global
affairs while been among the top ten economies in the World.(3)
Grigoriadis
sees contradictions on TFP’s practical enforcement mostly in Iran’s insistence
on nuclear exploitation and the risks Turkey assumes by approaching Iran IR
affairs along with the necessity of a EU membership for the attainment TFP’s
strategic potential, a democratic inclusion which as indispensable as it seems
remains a significant self-confrontation when faces the Kurdish opening and the
absence of a major overhaul of state-religion relations in Turkey manifest.
Moreover, he finds quite good to be true the best-case scenario for TFP where
Turkey’s unobstructed political expansion in the region and World will allow
her to live her dream.(4)
According
to Prof. Erkan Ertosun many considers that TFP is rooted on Turgut Ozal’s
period (1983-93) which was based “on implicit neo-realist assumptions that TFP
has to be responsive to changes in the external environment”.(5)
Following Hermann’s theory, he attributes TFP change to “Ozal factor” as
“leader-driven” who developed his own bureaucratic network and then focused on
changing the concept of Turkey’s Westernization through a differentiation
within the status quo. A gradual alteration through his own active and risky
positions, a multidimensional policy in accordance with Turkey’s pluralist
identity and new methods for exercising TFP.(6) He
equalized the Western bloc, the Eastern bloc of that time and the Middle
Eastern countries in his prioritization for TFP.(7) In the same time, he mentioned the crucial role of maintaining
Turkey’s credibility in the West by gaining value both from the latter and the
Islamic countries.(8) When British documents were revealed Ozal’s FP
appeared though “radical a realistic solution to Turkey’s problems along with
Ozal’s political personality as persuasive”.(9) Ertsosun finds that though Ozal’s turned northwards
and eastwards he did not bring an “international orientation change” as he
remained embraced mostly with Western allies.(10)
Turkish Foreign Policy
As Dean
Talcott Williams argues, Turkey was founded after the Ottoman Empire collapse
as a state where law, order and sound administration would exploit countries’
unique characteristics for global stability, a world paradigm for Muslims based
on the exploitation of abundant resources both tangible and conceptual due to
its geographical and cultural potential. He dreamed of a society in a uniform
civil status, a successful representative system of rule with a high self-rule
level of existence.(11)
Prof.
Joerg Baunder finds in AKP’s TFP two different role concepts. The past and
abandoned one of “defensive nationalism” and the latter and existing one of
“regional power” with the most salient sign the aim for change from “a bridge
between EU and the Islamic World” to “be the owner, pioneer and servant of the
new Middle East”.(12)
He delimits three distinctive TFP’s
periods, one with many traits of civilian power (2002-2005), shift towards the
Middle East with conflicts towards EU and the United States (2005-2010) and a
regional power concept only after the Mavi Marmara incident (2010) which marked
a hostile engagement with Israel.(13) The
latest one was adopted by economic and military resources (capability), a
sufficient number of states in the region to rally around TFP (influence) and
TFP’s recognition by other states in the region (perception).(14) President Erdogan in the course of his so-called
“Arab spring tour” in summer 2011 explicitly encouraged the new political
forces in the Arab states to follow the Turkish model of economic development
and type of secularism that is most identical to the “Anglo-Saxon or Western
model”.(15) In the same spirit as Kemal Kirici stated in 2012
went furthermore arguing that Davutoglu’s aspiration is “an integrated Middle
East where people and goods can move freely from Kars to the Atlantic, actually
reminiscent of the vison of the founding fathers of the EU”(16), Erdogan’s
statement in 2010 that “Turkey is becoming a global power”(17) was translated
in UN Security Council to the mutual objection with Brazil to sanctions against
Iran and a TFP’s self-conception as a “revisionist power” referring to
“reconfiguration of the global governance institutions”.(18)
Philip
Robbin argues that Turkey is a double gravity state that “feels the contrasting
gravitational pull of the norms of behavior of at least two regions, but fins
it difficult to reconcile these sets of claims”.(19) He
states that TFP cannot serve a global “core role” as there is neither power nor
strength to sustain such pursuit.(20) He
distinguishes more a “double gravity state”: a plausible yet volatile actor on
the edge of the subsystems of continental Europe and the middle East.(21)
Prof.
Birol Baskan argues that TFP after Arab Spring has not become as much sectarian
as it is conceived in discourses. He sees a balanced TFP in “the new Arab Cold
War” towards Saudi Arabia and Iran with an outstanding trade increase with both
key regional players in reality. Instead, he considers Ahmet Davutoglou as a
Civilizationalist who found in political Islam values superior to Western
civilization accepting modernization in a limited spectrum mostly referring to
technology and science without the same tendency for other characteristics such
as values, institutions and laws.(22) As Fukuyama failed in his prophecies for the “end of
the history” and Huntington for the inevitable “clash of civilizations” he
attributes to Davutoglu the conviction that Islamic civilization will take the
vital role to save the Western civilization.(23) Overall,
TFP’s spiritual leader was more than clear at the 6th Al-Jazeera
forum in Doha, Qatar, March 2011: “The future has not only arrived. It has been
delayed. The two abnormalities in the last century, colonialism and the Cold
War, are restored and any turbulence such as the developments in the Middle
East and Arab Spring are nothing else than natural reflections of the natural
flow of history.”(24)
Authors Aghayev and Aktas
acknowledge the complexity of the relations between Russia and Turkey as the
highest in modern IR.(25) As history reveals, moments of total confrontation
and full partnership as it was Bolsheviks-Kemal commitments against Entante
countries and Britain’s has reached nowadays a respective paradox. The
prerequisite for Turkey to secure its energy sustainment radically seems to
prevail.(26) Strong TFP’s lure towards Vladimir Putin’s Russia
develops indeed. A Treaty in 2010 between the two countries for building up a
nuclear power plant Akkuyu in Mersina, intense bilateral trade due to the EU
sanctions against Russia and the agreement to reach the volume of $100 billion
till 2019, S-400 powerful defense systems procurement from Turkey as well as
monetary interdependence consist of a nexus which is totally against Turkey
participation in NATO and EU integration aspirations of Western disengagement
from Russia. Syria War has proved to bring the two countries to both limits of
hostility and embracement putting in great risk TFP’s orientation and accuracy.
Authors Kang and Kim are examining
the nature of TFP engagement and alignment with Iran by adopting structural
realist theory of alliance and finding out that both are more bandwagoning with
the U.S instead of balancing against it. On the one hand, as long as Turkey remains
NATO member they don’t see any logic of balancing with Iran against the United States.(27)
On
the other hand, Iran coming back from isolation and its dire economic situation
has made Iran and Turkey alignment feasible. Even growing Salafism regionally
along with the two countries isolation made them see each other as new possible
allies for stability.(28) Not to disregard that TFP is reliant upon Iranian
hydrocarbon sources if not want to end up over-depended to Russia gas.(29) The
authors conclude that for US to continue its “pivot to Asia” a new balance in
the middle East is the requisite policy with Turkey and Iran elevation of
relative importance as needed with a simultaneous reduction of “special
relationship” with Saudi Arabia and Israel.(30)
TFP towards West
Huge Pope, author of the book “Dining with al-Queda:
Three Decades Exploring the Many Worlds of the Middle East”, admits that Turkey
does not fit neatly into anyone’s conception of the world order.(31) Turkey
with an important secondary role to play in many major areas for US, is
unusually vulnerable to being misunderstood, especially when themselves are
sending wrong messages about what they really want. For him TFP’s intentions in
both incidents, Israels’ Gaza blockage and Iran support in UN, were misjudged
and there are no sighs of Turkey approach to any Islamist. TFP is still vitally
linked with EU as trade proofs and collaboration with U.S. remains essential.
TFP’s tactics towards East should not misunderstood due to the threats that are
gushing from many regional sources.
Editor
of The International Spectator Nathalie Tocci elaborates on the perception from
EU regarding Turley’s regional activism in the 21th century. As she identifies
national interest as the factor to determine real TFP she acknowledges the
normative chapeau that Davutoglou’s doctrine provided to a plethora of state
and non-state actors for deeper ties with its neighbors.(32) After two decades of TFP’s enforcement she discerns
Turcoskeptics and Turcophiles inside EU with the former to project for Turkey a
useful ally role than a member of EU club. This leaves out benefits from
strategic assets for EU, a “go it alone” TFP option, and unexploited its
neighborhood embracement with EU more to blame for it.
Billi
Park in International Affairs refers to Wal Street Journal Ian Lesser’s article
“Our non-ally Ankara” arguing that Turkey “had long ago stopped acting like an
ally of the US or a friend of the West”.(33) With Turkey’s prospect of EU membership close to zero
Park considers not only Syria the trigger for Turkey’s distance from West but
also a harsh rhetoric against Israel and a role of conduit for Iranian
sanction-breakers and circumventors.(34) Clearer than ever, Erdogan has stated in November
2013 in regard to Turkey’s application to Putin to be incorporated into the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) “include us in the Shanghai Five and we
will forget about the EU”.(35) Even worse Park raises the question of Turkey as part
of the Middle East or just of its Muslim Brotherhood referring to TFP’s stance
in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere in the region.(36) Lastly,
she discerns an AKP instinctive tendency towards “illiberal democracy”
practiced by Vladimir Putin and other in Eurasia that counts for TFP entrenchment
and sometime resentment towards West an US.(37) With
this “splendid isolation” and no precedent for the expulsion of a country from
NATO she sees a stalemate, hopelessly unpredictable.
Prof. Mert Bilgin analyzes Turkeys’
official energy strategy correlating market characteristics, and geopolitics
and TFP. Based on Turkey’s regional transit hub role, with Bosporus and Dardanelles,
two international crude oil pipelines from Iraq and Azerbaijan to Ceyhan and a
possible natural gas pipeline discussed with Russia he fully associates
despaired needed Turkey’s energy agenda for great future with less quantitative
and multifaceted dimension of TFP. He concludes that a centripetal energy
strategy converged with a respective TFP one could function to foster regional
and global cooperation with the former in balancer’s role.(38)
Turkish Youth
Prof. Sabri Cifti in her paper based on a youth survey
in Cumhuriyet University in central Turkey shows the correlation between
student’s social identity and attitudes toward TFP. “Middle Easternization” has
come up in students discourses while the significant role of youth in the Arab
Spring raise their possible role in the future Turkey. 37% out of 800 students
believe that TFP is in the right track, 31% in a wrong and 32% neutral. 54% agree
that Turkey should be the leader of the Muslim World, yet 28% disagree; 29%
oppose EU membership.(39)
In
reference with their identities and perceptions of TFP 28% identify as “Muslim
first and then Turk”. 8% defines themselves “Muslim only” and 7.5% “first
Turk/Kurd and then Muslim” along with 7% “Turk”. In their international context
33% are both European and Middle Eastern, 21% only Middle Eastern and 12% only Europeans.(40) No
clear and strong association is observed between identity in relation to the
international context and TFP.(41)
When
prescribing future goals in TFP, university students assign greater weight to
the EU and the Turkic world. Notions such as balance of power, geopolitics, and
economic interests appear more than accounts describing new directions in TFP
as an axis shift or Middle Easternization.(42)
Conclusions
- Ozal’s
Turkey’s pluralist identity and multidimensional TFP seems to have been the
base on which Davutoglu and AKP built and implemented their own “post-modern”
Turkey theory of existence in the globalization era.
- Ozal’s
TFP though too radical remained realistic in a split ideological world as well which
gives a sign for Davutoglou’s TFP real core chemistry.
- Davutoglu
has provided the theoretical TFP background for Erdogan’s political domination
in Turkey. The latter’s political decisions in 2003 towards US invasion in
IRAQ, in 2010 engagement with Israel, in UN Security Council regarding Iran
nuclear program and nowadays military procurements from Russia and Iran secret
relations put in doubt TFP’s proclaimed goals and the veritable ones.
- No matter
TFP’s preference towards a gobal “central power” it resulted more to a
“regional power” in the second decade of 21th century due to centripetal forces
in the implementation of its pro-2010 TFP ambitions.
- Energy
starving Turkey needs power to accomplish its TFP’s over-ambitioned goals which
leads to old times IR theories, too risky to be handled by Turkey in the Middle
East’s contested and sensitive space.
- Political
Islam is above ethnic nationalism, not sectarian as granted, and in this way,
it can provide holistic alternatives for self-governing with TFP in a presumed
prominent role.
- TFP
under AKP has sustained fundamental differentiations causing confusion for its
true intent and putting in danger its credibility. It has transformed from a
visionary academic theory to a risky experiment with unknown end not excluding
that predicted in the end of WWI and relative Treaties.
- Especially
after Arab Spring, Erdogan’s tilting TFP has produced centripetal forces affecting
negatively the ‘model’ Turkey state that has been emerged in 20th
century and needs to be amended somehow again.
- Turkey-Russia
history cannot exclude a vital relationship between the two states in all areas
including military armaments. The same for the opposite.
- In any
way a TFP’s embracement with Russia will risk ending up to a fatal TFPs “absorption”
in a new “near abroad” Russia defined space.
- TFP’s
flirting with Iran is considered ephemeral and too early to create a concrete
ideology and an alternative governmental system against democracy.
- TFP’s stronger
alignment with Iran against people’s will risks to separate them and trigger
abnormal actions domestically.
- EU
accession, “civil power” and de-militarization in the first decade served AKP
to prevail the Kemalist elite and military and permitted afterwards the change
in TFP towards Muslims states in the Middle East, Iran and Russia nowadays.
- Scholars
are more prone to believe that TFP has distanced quite enough from West and EU
near to a “no-return” point.
- EU
authorities should embrace TFP’s regional and global aspirations in their
common interests and address them by facilitating Turkey’s accession in the EU
pending the latter’s compliance with the membership’s criteria.
- EU
countries, Israel and Kurds will remain regulators of TFP unless Turkey wants
to sail in “no cartographic IR waters”.
- A
global strategic relationship with he United States seems to be the only viable
solution for Turkey if it doesn’t want the TFP triangle that now rebalances adventurously
to collapse and finds itself in the ruins.
- Youth
survey has shown a divided future for Turkey between the dilemma of Europe and
Middle East with the latter more prevailing leading to unknown series of
self-harassments if intensifies.
- TFP
has to be in accordance with its state architecture and foundation pillars’ strength
that were erected back in 1923. Any exaggerations will put in danger its own
sturdiness and finally risking its own state existence in the “post-modern’
era.
1.
Grigoriadis, N.Ioannis, “The Davutoglu Doctrine and
Turkish Foreign Policy”, ELIAMEP, Middle Eastern Studies Programme, Working
paper No8 April 2010, p.4.
2.
Baudner, Joerg,
“The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government,
Insight Turkey, Vol.16, No.3, 2014, pp.87.
3.
Grigoriadis, “The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish
Foreign Policy”, p.9.
4.
Grigoriadis, “The Davutoglu Doctrine and Turkish
Foreign Policy”, p.10.
5.
Ertosun, Erkun, “Change and leadership in Foreign in
Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”,
Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 2, June 2016, pp. 47.
6.
Ertosun, “Change and leadership in Foreign in Foreign
Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”, p. 49.
7.
Ertosun, “Change and leadership in Foreign in Foreign
Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”, p. 59.
8.
Ertosun,
“Change and leadership in Foreign in Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s
premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”, p. 61.
9.
Ertosun, “Change and leadership in Foreign in Foreign
Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”, p. 65.
10.
Ertosun,
“Change and leadership in Foreign in Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s
premiership in Turkey, 1983-1989”, p. 66.
11.
Wiliams, Talcott, “The American idea in the Near
East”, Kurdish life, Number 61, Winter 2007, p.1.
12. Baudner,
“The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government, p.80.
13. Baudner, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy
under the AK Party Government, p.83.
14. Baudner, “The
Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government, p.85.
15. Baudner, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy
under the AK Party Government, p.92.
16. Baudner, “The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy
under the AK Party Government, p.93.
17. Baudner, “The Evolution
of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government, p.94.
18. Baudner,
“The Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AK Party Government, p.95.
19.
Robins
Philip, “Turkey’s ‘double gravity’ predicament: the foreign policy of a newly
activist power”, International Affairs Vol.89, No.2, 2013, pp. 381.
20. Robins, “Turkey’s ‘double gravity’ predicament: the
foreign policy of a newly activist power”, p. 382.
21. Robins, “Turkey’s ‘double gravity’ predicament: the
foreign policy of a newly activist power”, p. 382.
22. Baskan, Birol,
“Making Sense of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Clashing Identities and Interests”,
The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary, 2016, pp.150
23. Baskan, “Making
Sense of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Clashing Identities and Interests”, p.150.
24. Baskan, “Making
Sense of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Clashing Identities and Interests”, p.151.
25. Aghayev Elvin, Aktas Hayati, “Prospects of cooperation
between Russia and Turkey”, European Researcher, Series A, Vol 8, No.2, 2017,
pp.98
26. Aghayev, Aktas,
“Prospects of cooperation between Russia and Turkey”, p.99.
27. Kang, Kim,
“Turco-Iranian Alignment: Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?”, pp. 24.
28. Kang, William, Kim Jaechun, “Turco-Iranian Alignment:
Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?”, Journal of International Affairs,
Vol.23, No.1, June 2016, pp. 27.
29.
Bilgin, Mert, “Turkey’s Energy Strategy: Synchronizing
geopolitics and Foreign policy with Energy Security”, Insight Turkey, Vol 17,
No.2, 2015, p.76.
30. Kang, Kim,
“Turco-Iranian Alignment: Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?”, pp. 28.
31.
Pope, Huge, “Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of
turkey’s New Foreign policy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.89, No.6, Nov/Dec 2010,
pp.161.
32.
Tocci, Nathalie, “Turkey’s neighborhood policy and EU
membership: Squaring the circle of Turkish foreign policy, International
Journal, Vol.67, No.1, Winter 2011-12, pp.68.
33.
Park, Bill,
“Turkey’s isolated stance; an ally no more, or just the usual turbulence?”,
International Affairs Vol 91, No.3, 2015, pp. 581.
34.
Park, Bill, “Turkey’s isolated stance; an ally no
more, or just the usual turbulence?”, p. 587.
35.
Park, Bill, “Turkey’s isolated stance; an ally no
more, or just the usual turbulence?”, p. 591.
36.
Park, Bill, “Turkey’s isolated stance; an ally no
more, or just the usual turbulence?”, p. 592.
37.
Park, Bill, “Turkey’s isolated stance; an ally no
more, or just the usual turbulence?”, p. 596.
38.
Bilgin, Mert, “Turkey’s Energy Strategy: Synchronizing
geopolitics and Foreign policy with Energy Security”, Insight Turkey, Vol 17,
No.2, 2015, p.80.
39.
Cifti, Sabri, “Social Identity and Attitudes
toward Foreign Policy: Evidence from a Youth Survey in Turkey”, Int.J.Middle
East Stud.45, 2013, p.32.
40.
Cifti, “Social Identity and Attitudes toward
Foreign Policy: Evidence from a Youth Survey in Turkey”, p.33.
41.
Cifti, “Social Identity and Attitudes toward
Foreign Policy: Evidence from a Youth Survey in Turkey”, p.35.
42.
Cifti,
“Social Identity and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy: Evidence from a Youth
Survey in Turkey”, p.39.
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